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Impact
A regulatory impact analysis must accompany every economically significant federal 
rule or regulation. The Office of Policy Development and Research performs this 
analysis for all U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development rules. An impact 
analysis is a forecast of the annual benefits and costs accruing to all parties, including 
the taxpayers, from a given regulation. Modeling these benefits and costs involves use of 
past research findings, application of economic principles, empirical investigation, and 
professional judgment.
Summary of Impact Analysis
The Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA’s) authorizing statute for insurance authorities, the 
National Housing Act, clearly states that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) will adjust program standards and practices to operate the Mutual Mortgage Insurance 
Fund (MMIF) on a self-sustaining basis. In the Notice “Federal Housing Administration Risk 
Management Initiatives: Reduction of Seller Concessions and New Loan-to-Value and Credit Score 
Requirements,”1 FHA proposes to tighten portions of its underwriting guidelines that present an 
excessive level of risk to both homeowners and FHA. The benefit of the set of actions outlined in 
the Notice will reduce the net losses resulting from high rates of insurance claims on affected loans, 
and the cost of the action will be the value of the loan opportunity denied to the excluded borrow-
ers. The total transfer to FHA would be $96 million, and the net cost of excluding borrowers could 
be as high as $85 million.
Need for Policy Change
FHA has resumed a countercyclical position, supporting private lending for homeownership when 
access to private sources of capital for credit enhancements is otherwise constrained by the recent 
financial crisis. This state of affairs is most evident in the rapid increase in the volume of FHA 
1 “Federal Housing Administration Risk Management Initiatives: Reduction of Seller Concessions and New Loan-to-Value 





insurance as private sources of mortgage finance retreated from the market. The growth in the 
MMIF portfolio over a 2-year period coincides with a set of difficult economic conditions, namely, 
continued housing price declines and increasing levels of unemployment. Together, these external 
conditions increase the risk of additional losses to FHA.
A recently issued independent actuarial study2 shows that the MMIF capital ratio has fallen below 
its statutorily mandated threshold of 2 percent. The study reported that FHA would likely sustain 
significant losses from mortgage loans made before 2009 due to the high concentration of seller-
funded downpayment assistance mortgage loans and declining real estate values nationwide.
FHA can implement four primary policy changes to replenish the MMIF capital reserve account: 
(1) increase premium rates to raise income, (2) reduce losses on new business by tightening 
underwriting guidelines, (3) strengthen enforcement measures to reduce unwarranted claim pay-
ments, and (4) avoid claims through enhanced loss mitigation efforts. FHA is engaged in efforts on 
all these fronts, exercising its full authority under the terms of the National Housing Act, including 
new authorities provided in recently enacted legislation. This Notice further complements the 
underwriting approach to strengthening FHA’s fiduciary responsibilities.
Summary of Notice
First, FHA proposes to reduce the amount of financing costs that the property seller or other inter-
ested party may pay on behalf of a homebuyer using an FHA-insured mortgage. This proposed cap 
on seller concessions would more closely align FHA’s single-family mortgage insurance programs 
with standard industry practice and minimize FHA exposure to the risk of insuring borrowers most 
likely to default. When a homeseller or interested third party pays all or part of the buyer’s cost of 
financing, the payments are commonly referred to as seller concessions. Although HUD previously 
allowed seller concessions up to 6 percent of the sales price, conventional mortgage lenders have 
capped seller concessions at 3 percent of the sales price on loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
similar to FHA standards. FHA proposes to cap the seller concession in FHA-insured single-family 
mortgage transactions at 3 percent of the lesser of the sales price or appraised value for purposes 
of calculating the maximum mortgage amount. Although seller concessions above 3 percent would 
not be prohibited under this proposal, concessions that exceed FHA’s 3-percent cap would require 
a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the sales price for the purposes of calculating the maximum FHA 
loan amount. One reason for this change is that borrowers who received more than 3 percent in 
seller concessions had a significantly higher risk of losing their homes. This proposed cap will not 
only align FHA’s single-family mortgage insurance programs to private industry practice but also 
will help ensure that borrowers who rely on FHA-insured financing have a sufficient investment in 
their home, thereby making them less likely to default on the mortgage.
Second, FHA proposes to introduce a two-part credit-score threshold, with a lower threshold for 
loans with LTV ratios of 90 percent or less and a higher threshold for those loans with higher LTV 
ratios. This will be the first time that FHA has ever instituted an absolute lower threshold for bor-
rower credit scores (as measured by FICO). Borrowers with low credit scores present higher risks 
2 See IFE (2009).
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for defaulting and filing a mortgage insurance claim. FHA is proposing to introduce a minimum 
decision credit score of no less than 500 to determine eligibility for FHA financing and to also 
reduce the maximum LTV for all borrowers with decision credit scores of less than or equal to 579. 
Maximum FHA-insured financing (96.5-percent LTV for purchase transactions and 97.75-percent 
LTV for rate-and-term refinance transactions) would be available only to borrowers with credit 
scores at or above 580. All borrowers with decision credit scores between 500 and 579 would be 
limited to a maximum 90-percent LTV.
Although today FHA is serving very few borrowers with credit scores below 500, as shown in 
exhibit 1, the performance of these borrowers is clearly very poor, as reflected in exhibit 2. Borrowers 
with credit scores below 500 struggle to meet their mortgage obligations. The percentage of borrowers  
who ultimately lose their homes is twice as high for borrowers with lower credit scores. Similarly, 
FHA data demonstrate that borrowers with decision credit scores below 580, who invest only a  
minimal amount of funds into the transaction, struggle to make their mortgage payments and ulti- 
mately lose their homes at a rate that is unacceptable to FHA. The borrowers affected by this Notice  
have seriously delinquent rates that are four to five times higher than those who remain eligible.
Third, FHA will tighten underwriting standards for mortgage loan transactions that are manually 
underwritten. The purpose of mortgage underwriting is to determine a borrower’s ability and will-
ingness to repay the debt and to limit the probability of default. For cases in which the borrower 
has a very limited or nontraditional credit history, the credit bureaus may not be able to calculate a 
credit score. Mortgage loans for borrowers in this category will need to be manually underwritten. 
These categories of borrowers present a higher level of risk and, as a result, manual underwriting 
guidelines, in general, are more stringent to address that higher risk level.
Costs and Benefits
Given the importance of maintaining a viable MMIF for existing and future homeowners, it is 
FHA’s intent to focus only on particular practices that have been found to result in extremely poor 
mortgage loan performance.
Aggregate Loans Affected
The highlighted portion of exhibit 1 indicates the proportion of borrowers expected to be im-
mediately excluded from the FHA guarantee by the Notice, relative to the total FHA portfolio. 
This policy is still important to FHA because HUD’s expectation are that, after the conventional 
mortgage market recovers and lenders again loosen underwriting standards, FHA could be 
adversely selected with larger shares of these higher risk loans. As late as fiscal year (FY) 2008, 
loans that would be newly excluded under this proposed policy accounted for more than 8 percent 
of all loans insured by FHA (excluding streamline refinancing).
Exhibit 2 clearly indicates through the performance data provided that these borrowers are at a sig-
nificantly greater risk of losing their homes than are other FHA-insured borrowers. The seriously 
delinquent rate of borrowers subject to the proposed restrictions (weighted average across the 




In 2008, FHA endorsements numbered 1.4 million and were, as of the third quarter of 2009, ap-
proaching an annual level of approximately 2 million (U.S. Housing Market Conditions, November 
2009). Current endorsement levels are likely to be a historic maximum. In normal years, endorse-
ment levels are closer to 1.5 million. In our modeling, we used 1.5 million as the default, 2 million 
as a maximum, and 1 million as minimum. Multiplying these endorsement numbers by the current 
share of subprime loans—1.42 percent—yields an assumed total of loans affected by the Notice of 
21,300, with a maximum of 28,400 and a minimum of 14,200.
Benefit of Policy Change
The direct purpose of the policy change outlined in this Notice is to achieve the statutorily 
mandated minimum capital reserve ratio of 2 percent. The broader purpose of the policy change, 
however, is to ensure the survival of the FHA so that it can continue to provide mortgage loans 
when private markets fail. The current financial crisis has led to a credit crunch in which FHA has 
been a lender of last resort to low-income and risky borrowers. Today, FHA’s share of the single-
family mortgage market is approximately 20 percent, up from 2 percent in 2007, and the dollar 
volume of insurance written has jumped from just $56 billion in 2007 to more than $300 billion 
in 2009. Facilitating the provision of credit during a liquidity crisis is a welfare-enhancing activity, 
and FHA provides such a public benefit. Quantifying this benefit would involve measuring the 
extent to which this Notice increased the survival of the FHA and multiplying this probability by 










None 300–499 500–579 580–619 620–679 680–850
FHA Single-Family Insurance Endorsement Shares in Calendar Year 2009
FHA Single-Family Mortgage Insurance: Seriously Delinquent Rates by  
LTV and Credit Scores
Up to 90% 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.48 2.28 3.51
Above 90% 0.34 0.02 1.39 7.24 35.80 48.77
Up to 90% 13.3 35.4 22.4 15.7 6.1 1.5
Above 90% 20.9 43.3 30.4 19.6 8.6 2.3
FHA = Federal Housing Administration.
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development/FHA; “Federal Housing Administration Risk Management 
Initiatives: Reduction of Seller Concessions and New Loan-to-Value and Credit Score Requirements,” Table A, FR-5404-N-01, 
Federal Register, July 15, 2010, available at http://federalregister.gov/a/2010-17326
FHA = Federal Housing Administration. LTV =  loan to value.
Note: Seriously delinquent rates measure the sum of cases that are 90 days or more delinquent, in foreclosure, and in 
bankruptcy as a percent of all actively insured loans on a given date.
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development/FHA; “Federal Housing Administration Risk Management 
Initiatives: Reduction of Seller Concessions and New Loan-to-Value and Credit Score Requirements,” Table B, FR-5404-N-01, 
Federal Register, July 15, 2010, available at http://federalregister.gov/a/2010-17326
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The current financial crisis has been attributed to many different causes—from government failure 
to a natural readjustment of markets. Many good arguments, however, support the theory that a  
financial crisis is the result of inefficiencies caused by imperfect information and perverse incentives. 
For example, Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo, and Park (1993) describe a negative selection externality 
that “bad” financial firms have on “good” financial firms during a credit crunch. The mere percep-
tion of a troubling credit market can affect investors’ willingness to provide equity to good firms. 
Because bad firms’ actions have spoiled the market, investors will not provide an efficient level of 
capital to the financial market. Cassidy (2009) explains in great detail how this scenario fits the 
current financial crisis. Large financial institutions have borrowed from others to make bets on 
risky assets using complex financial instruments. Given the complexity of these financial arrange-
ments, it is difficult, even for well-informed insiders, to gauge the value of the firms holding these 
risky assets on their balance sheets. After housing price appreciation began to slow down and the 
value of the financial institutions investing subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS) became 
uncertain, lenders were unwilling to provide credit to these large institutions because they feared 
that the borrower would not be able to repay. The result was an economy-wide credit crunch in 
which ordinary borrowers were not able to acquire a loan at a reasonable cost.
In another example of a market failure, the monitoring of financial firms is a public good that is 
undersupplied (Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo, and Park, 1993). Institutional banks will not decrease 
their leverage ratios to a point that reduces systemic risk for the entire financial market. Within a 
financial institution, management has the ability to limit its firm’s risk to decrease the likelihood 
that their firm collapses. The benefit from a firm lowering its risk, however, will have spillover 
benefits to all the financial market stakeholders by lowering the chance of contagion. As a result, a 
financial institution will not receive enough compensation to lower its leverage ratio to the efficient 
level. In hindsight, many of the financial institutions originating MBS can be considered to have 
become overleveraged during the years preceding the financial crisis of 2007–2010.
FHA loans are now in higher demand as a result of the failure or withdrawal of private investors 
from the mortgage market. Thus, the primary contribution of FHA to the public welfare is to 
facilitate the transition to sustainable homeownership for low-income or credit-constrained individuals 
when the market is not achieving this goal on its own. Because both private and public benefits 
(described in the next section) are associated with homeownership, a postponement of those 
benefits, as a result of a poorly functioning credit market, would represent a reduction in welfare.
Cost of Excluding Borrowers
The goal of FHA is to promote a national housing policy by providing access to mortgage credit for 
first-time homebuyers and others with limited financial wealth. Tightening underwriting guidelines 
will cause excluded households to delay their transition to homeownership status (or perhaps 
never make the transition). For refinance loans, the proposed restrictions will cause higher housing 
costs until such time as when the excluded households can improve their credit histories and gain 
more home equity through general market-level house price appreciation. A few analytical options 




Costs of a Different Mortgage Loan
One approach to measuring the advantages of an FHA loan is to estimate the private gain to the house- 
hold of an FHA loan by deriving an estimate of the additional costs a borrower would have to pay to 
receive a similar loan not insured by FHA. FHA does not earn a profit as a private mortgage insurer 
would. The average gain would be what the borrower would have had to pay for the same insurance 
on the private market. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is no longer current practice to  
insure borrowers with low credit scores. The private mortgage insurance market has never served 
the segment of borrowers who would be eliminated from FHA eligibility by this Notice, and the 
subprime market where they previously could have turned for home financing no longer exists. 
Although the FHA guaranty has value, it would be impossible to measure it through such a method.
Private Benefits of Homeownership
A second approach is to compare the private benefits of renting with the benefits of homeownership. 
Given the state of the market, an FHA-guaranteed loan may represent the only path to homeowner- 
ship for low-income households. Those households that apply for a loan clearly believe that own-
ership is the optimal financial decision. Some of the potential benefits of homeownership would be 
a lower quality-adjusted price for housing, higher satisfaction, and wealth creation.3
A tenant could be expected to pay less for the same unit of housing as an owner occupant than as 
a renter. Higher costs for renters arise because of an information asymmetry. A landlord does not 
know in advance of extending a lease to what extent a tenant will inflict damage, make an effort to 
take care of the property, or report urgent problems. An owner occupant, on the other hand, has a 
financial interest in taking care of the property. Thus, both the depreciation and maintenance costs 
of rental housing can be expected to be higher—a market imperfection that will create an incentive 
for transition to owner-occupied housing. The difference in owner-occupant and renter behavior 
would also lead to a difference in the type of housing offered; in general, owner-occupied housing 
is of a higher quality.
Higher satisfaction from owner occupancy stems from the greater freedom to alter the property 
to suit one’s taste and from not being subject to variable housing costs (when the alternative is a 
fixed-rate mortgage). It is also possible that owner occupancy provides access to neighborhoods 
and municipalities where long-term rental housing is hard to find.
A frequently perceived benefit of ownership is one of wealth creation. The federal government 
encourages investment in residential real estate by, in most cases, not taxing the capital gains from 
selling one’s home. The asset-building advantage of homeownership materializes only when hous-
ing prices appreciate. The downside of homeownership, of course, is the risk of investing most of 
one’s wealth into a single asset. Foreclosure would represent a greater hardship than eviction from 
a rental property. In the current market, it is unlikely that investment opportunity is the primary 
motive for becoming a homeowner.
Homeownership also has significant upfront costs. Becoming a homeowner entails paying upfront 
costs, such as realtor, settlement, and lender fees. A household could easily spend 10 percent of 
3 For a good literature review of both the private and public benefits of homeownership, see Dietz and Haurin (2003).
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the purchase price on transaction costs. A lower bound estimate would be 3 percent (see Dietz 
and Haurin, 2003). Given the fixed costs, households for whom owning is a better choice would 
not expect to move soon after purchasing. The transition to homeownership is associated with 
expected low mobility and, thus, a higher age, family size, and income.
The dollar value of the reduction in housing costs can be estimated with census data. The average 
income of households excluded by the Notice is $70,000. For households of this income, the rent-
to-income ratio is 14.90 percent, which translates to $10,430 in annual rent payments. Suppose 
that becoming an owner leads to a reduction in housing cost for a unit of comparable quality. The 
benefit can be measured as a percentage reduction of the annual rent payments. For example, a 
sizeable 4-percent reduction leads to $417 annual benefit to households (4 percent x $10,430).
The total value of the annual reduction in housing costs will be affected by the number of years 
that the benefit is denied and by the discount rate. We assume that the effect of denying the 
opportunity of an FHA loan to the population in question will be to delay homeownership. As the 
length of the delay increases, so does the loss in consumer benefits. With higher discount rates, 
the present values of future years are reduced and thus the private opportunity cost of delay is 
diminished. Households that find the transition to homeownership a beneficial decision will work 
to repair their credit score. Most of the negatives will be removed from a credit report after 7 years, 
and it is possible to increase credit scores significantly after 3 years by better managing consumer 
debt. A reasonable outside estimate of the number of years homeownership would be delayed is 5 
years. We choose 3 percent as our default discount rate given the similarity of that rate to what was 
used in the FHA actuarial model. This calculation is shown in exhibit 3, column 2.
The size of the rental externality also plays a role. It can be seen as the difference between the 
sum of the depreciation and maintenance rates of rental housing and owner-occupied housing. 
Conventional wisdom among lenders is that households should budget from 1 to 3 percent of the 
original purchase price for annual maintenance to prevent significant depreciation.4 If the rental 
depreciation rate were twice that of owner-occupied housing, the range for rental housing main-
tenance costs would be 2 to 6 percent, making 4 percent a plausible outside estimate of the size  
of the rental externality. Given the annual benefit of $417 (based on an externality of 4 percent),  
a delay of 5 years, and a discount rate of 3 percent, the present value of the loss would be $1,922.
Although the argument of Henderson and Ioannides (1983) has great theoretical validity, not much  
empirical work supports the claim that renters pay more than homeowners for constant-quality 
housing. Evidence exists, however, that rental housing does depreciate at a greater rate than owner- 
occupied housing. Iwata and Yamaga (2004) estimated the probability of a house being in “sound” 
condition, depending on whether it was owner-occupied housing, tenant-occupied housing, or 
landlord-owned housing. They found that the probability of a house being in sound condition 
decreases by 6 percent if a house is landlord-owned housing compared with owner-occupied 
housing. Wang, Grissom, and Webb (1991) estimated the price difference of a single-family home, 
depending on whether it was renter occupied or owner occupied. If the house had been a rental 
property, its selling price would have decreased by $2,428, which is approximating 3.7 percent of 




the price of a “standard house.” This 3.7-percent decline in value is roughly equal to our estimate 
of the rental externality derived using assumptions concerning the differences in maintenance 
and depreciation rates. Shilling, Sirmans, and Dombrow (1991) found that renter-occupied 
housing depreciates 1.9 percent more each year than owner-occupied housing. Using repeat sales 
data, Gatzlaff and Green (1998) found that the difference is very small, only 0.16 percent. This 
negligible difference in housing value may reflect that landlords are using the additional revenue 
collected through the rental externality to invest in their property.
The reduction in housing costs through homeownership is considered a benefit to society because 
the source of the reduction is a decline in the cost of supplying the housing. If it were only a 
transfer between consumers (renters who become homeowners) and producers (landlords), then 
the transition to homeownership would represent a zero-sum gain for society. A social gain exists, 
however, because the removal of the rental externality is equivalent to a reduction in the cost of 
supplying housing services for the household that made the transition to ownership. Landlords 
charge a rental premium to compensate them for the damage that occurs to their property given 
the incentives that renters face. Transition to homeownership changes those incentives and gener-
ates net benefits for society.
A final and important point to make concerning consumer benefits is that not all borrowers 
excluded by the Notice would have realized the benefits of homeownership. Some of those who 
receive a loan will default and be foreclosed upon. To accurately measure the private benefits of 
homeownership, we need to account for the chance that not all households who become owners 
will remain owners. The probability that a homeownership will survive until a specific year with-
out a foreclosure is equivalent to 1 less the probability that the household will not be foreclosed 
upon, or the cumulative claim rate for that year. Cumulative claim rates increase over time with the 
greatest increase occurring in the third or fourth year, yielding an S-shaped survival curve. Using 
the cumulative claim rates for the excluded group in the fifth year of approximately 11.1 percent, 
the estimate of the expected private loss is $1,709 per household (88.9 percent x $1,922).
Public Benefits of Homeownership
A third approach to measuring the advantages of an FHA loan would be to evaluate the social 
benefits of a household becoming a homeowner. The traditional argument for homeownership is 
that a homeowner will invest more in his or her community because a financial incentive exists 
to improve the quality of the neighborhood and thus home values. Maintaining properties will 
also have positive spillover effects to neighboring property values. In addition, an engagement by 
homeowners will lead to greater political activity, a more amenable urban environment, and less 
crime. A literature exists that also links housing tenure with child outcomes (health and education). 
One negative social effect of homeownership is reduced mobility, which leads to rigidity in the 
labor market and thus lengthens economic downturns.
This type of empirical research has some obvious methodological challenges. Disentangling the 
explanatory variable (tenure status) with other characteristics of the household is difficult when 
the path to ownership depends on credit score, which depends on the stability and thrift of the 
household. Strong empirical evidence has been found, however, for the positive effect on child 
outcomes, political activity, and wealth accumulation and for the negative effect on mobility.
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Homeownership seems to have both social costs and benefits, and the empirical evidence for some 
of the most compelling arguments for encouraging homeownership is weak. A new wave of empiri-
cal research has generated much more modest estimates of the social value of homeownership. For 
the sake of argument, however, we choose one study by Coulson and Li (2010) that does not focus 
on the cause of the benefits but produces an empirically rigorous estimate of the impact of adding 
a homeowner to a neighborhood.
Coulson and Li (2010) used data from the American Housing Survey and analyzed housing clus-
ters that included between 6 and 16 single-family homes. They found that a 100-percent increase 
in the homeownership rate in a cluster raises the price of a housing unit by 40 to 50 percent. In 
one example, they calculated that the transition of an additional unit would raise the value of other 
units by 4.1 percent. If the average price per unit is $170,000, this calculation signifies an increase 
of $6,970 per unit. Therefore, the externality benefit of ownership for the rest of the typical cluster 
of 9 homes is $62,370 (9 x $6,970). The value of 1 year of public benefits is the discount rate 
times the total stream of benefits, or $1,882 (3 percent x $62,370). The opportunity cost to the 
public of preventing transition to homeownership is the loss of the present value of the stream of 
public externalities. If a household’s transition were delayed for 5 years, the present value of the 
stream of lost public benefits would be $8,673 (at a 3-percent discount rate and $1,882 annually) 
as shown in exhibit 3.
The expected loss from delay is equal to the dollar amount of the lost benefit times the probability 
that the household would remain as owner occupants. This probability is equal to 1 less the cumula-
tive claim rate. With a delay of 5 years, the expected loss from delay would be $7,711. As shown in 
exhibit 3, the sum of the private and public costs is $10,595 and the expected total cost is $9,419.
In the previous estimate of the expected cost to society of excluding a household from homeowner-
ship, we assume that the only effect of excluding a household is the denial of the benefits of 
homeownership. We did not account for the possible social costs of foreclosure for every home-
owner created. Sizeable losses exist, however, from a foreclosure borne by consumers, lenders, 








































Net Expected Opportunity Cost of Delaying Households From Transition to  
Home ownership (3-Percent Discount Rate)
1 0.14 417 1,882 2,299 2,296 52,190 72 2,224 
2 1.88 810 3,656 4,466 4,382 49,194 929 3,453 
3 5.60 1,192 5,378 6,570 6,201 47,761 2,743 3,458 
4 8.61 1,562 7,050 8,612 7,870 46,370 4,221 3,649 
5 11.1 1,922 8,673 10,595 9,419 45,020 5,446 3,974 
6 13.1 2,271 10,249 12,521 10,879 43,708 6,436 4,442 




from a foreclosure would include transaction costs, the distress discount on the property, and the 
negative effect on the value of surrounding properties.
To calculate transaction costs, we sum broker and legal fees. Broker fees are 6 percent of the property 
value ($10,200 = 6 percent x $170,000) and legal fees are 2 percent of the loan value ($2,720 =  
2 percent x $136,000, assuming an 80-percent LTV ratio). Total transaction costs are $12,920.
The reduction in property value from the investor being forced to sell a home because it is 
foreclosed upon (stress discount) is a second source of deadweight loss. It is not obvious, however, 
whether the stress discount should be counted as a cost rather than a transfer. Although the seller 
will lose from a reduction of property value, the buyer may gain from the opportunity to purchase 
at a lower price. Pennington-Cross (2006) found that Real Estate Owned (REO) properties suffer a 
22-percentage point discount in appreciation rates compared with the metropolitan average appre-
ciation rates. Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS, 2008) uses a stress factor of 15 percent to estimate 
the additional decrease in value from selling a foreclosed property. One obvious explanation for 
this result is one of reverse causation; a default may occur because appreciation in a particular 
submarket lags behind the metropolitan average. Negative price appreciation may result in rational 
default by the borrower once the value of the loan exceeds the value of the home.
Two other theoretical explanations for this empirical result provide insights into economic behavior. 
The first explanation is the possibility that in an environment of asymmetric information a foreclosure 
is a signal of a “lemon” property, in which case the buyer is compensated through a lower purchase 
price for taking a risk. A second explanation of the stress discount to the values of foreclosed homes 
involves behavior that creates a deadweight loss to society. Frequently, before owners sell a home, 
they invest a great deal into the structure, at least into the cosmetic aspects of the property. An 
owner who knows that he or she will default will cease to maintain and upgrade the property 
and may even actively disinvest (sell appliances or fixtures, for example). The depreciation to the 
property is structural and real; the new owner must invest resources to restore the property to its 
preforeclosure state. Harding et al. (2000) found evidence of this externality: borrowers with high 
LTV ratios spend, on average, 19 percent less on maintenance than those with lower LTV ratios. 
Knowledge of impending default would increase the overuse of housing. We assume that this 
structural damage is equivalent to the entire value of the UBS estimate of the stress discount on the 
property, which yields $25,500 (15 percent x $170,000).
Foreclosures resulting in long-term vacancies have a negative effect on the value of neighboring 
properties by reducing the physical appearance of the neighborhood, attracting crime, and depressing 
the local economy. The study of Immergluck and Smith (2006) reports a reduction of 0.9 percent 
of value for all properties within one-eighth of a mile. One approach to using the results from this 
literature would be to limit the negative externalities to close neighbors (ones directly adjacent and 
across from the foreclosed property: two on each side of the property and five across the street). 
Doing so would limit the aggregate effect to $13,770 (0.9 percent x $170,000 x 9).
The total social cost per foreclosure would be $52,190 ($12,920 + $25,500 + $13,770). The 
expected social cost of foreclosure is the sum divided by the length of the delay of the probabilities 
of a foreclosure occurring in a particular year (the conditional claim rate) times the discounted 
value of the social cost of the foreclosure. With our assumed cumulative claim rates, a delay of 
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5 years, and a discount rate of 3 percent, the expected social cost of a foreclosure is $5,446. As 
shown in exhibit 3, column 8, the net expected cost of excluding a borrower is thus: (1 – probability 
of foreclosure) x opportunity cost of preventing ownership + probability of foreclosure x cost of 
foreclosure. With a 5-year delay, the net expected cost of excluding a borrower is $3,974.
Transfers to FHA
When FHA tightens its underwriting guidelines, it will reduce the net claim expense associated 
with loans for which delinquency leads to an insurance claim. HUD bases its proforma budget 
accounting on forecasts of claim and prepayment rates calculated using the forecasting model from 
the independent actuarial study of the MMIF (IFE, 2009), but using the economic projections of 
the President’s Budget. The actuarial models rely on 30 years of actual FHA experience and are 
calibrated to produce loan-performance outcomes using forecasts of future economic conditions. 
The following equation represents the expected net claim expense associated with any given loan, 
in any given year:
Expected claim amount = claim rate x (loss rate x unpaid loan balance).
The claim rate is the number of claims during a particular time period divided by the total number 
of loans endorsed when an annual insurance cohort was underwritten. For the FY 2011 cohort, 
the most recent budget forecasts a 19.63-percent cumulative claim rate. The time trend of the 
claim rates over 30 years is estimated using the predicted cumulative claim rates from the actuarial 
review (IFE, 2009: page F-7). The cumulative claim rates from the actuarial review were inflated 
by a factor of 2.76 to account for the higher claim rate predicted among the higher risk, excluded 
group (19.63 percent/7.11 percent).
The loss rate is the net loss after property-sale recoveries, as a percentage of the unpaid loan bal-
ance on the defaulting loan. Exhibit E-1 of the actuarial review provides a time series of loss rates. 
The 2000s began with loss rates as low as 32 percent but reached 56 percent by 2008. Current 
estimates by FHA for the 2011 cohort is that the loss rate on average is 47.64 percent and that the 
loss rate for the excluded borrowers will be higher at 51.22 percent.
Using recent FHA data, we found that the average loan originated to the group of individuals 
affected by the Notice is smaller than the global average: $153,000 as opposed to $176,600. Using 
$150,000 as our default and assuming an interest rate of 6 percent, the annual mortgage payment 
would be $10,987. The decline in the unpaid balance is slow at first, decreasing approximately 
$2,000 in the first year, because mortgage payments consist of primarily interest at the beginning 
of the repayment; by the end of the loan’s 30 years, the decline reaches $10,000.
For example, in the second year, the unpaid balance on the $150,000 loan would be $148,103. 
The claim amount, therefore, would be $75,858 (51.22 percent x $148,103). Using an annual 
unconditional claim rate of 1.74 percent,5 the expected claim amount would be $1,295. The 
present value of the expected claim paid in the second year would be $1,258 (when the discount 
rate is approximately 3 percent).6
5 The unconditional claim rate is an annual rate consistent with the annual change in the cumulative claim rate.




Next, we summed the present values of the expected claims paid over all years to arrive at an 
estimate of the expected claim. For our parameters, the expected claim amount is $10,268. We 
multiplied this amount by the original number of endorsements to arrive at a total across all loans. 
Whether FHA should expect a gain or loss depends on the mortgage insurance premium income:
Expected loss per loan = expected claim amount – upfront premium – periodic premium income.
The upfront mortgage insurance premium is equal to 2.25 percent of the original loan balance, or 
$3,375, when the loan balance is $150,000. For LTVs greater than 95 percent, which represent 
approximately 40 percent of the affected borrowers, the annual premium is 0.55 percent of the 
unpaid loan balance and is collected until the unpaid balance reaches 78 percent of the original 
loan amount. In a specific year, the proportion of loans that pays the periodic premium is assumed 
to be (1 – unconditional claim rate) plus one-half the prepayment rate (to reflect that prepayers 
would have paid one-half per year). The expected net present value of the premium income 
(upfront + annual) is $5,777 ($3,375 + $2,402). The net loss per loan to FHA is $4,491.
A reduction of net losses from the subject loans provides a direct benefit to the financial status of 
the MMIF. Over time, it is also possible that this reduction of FHA losses could lead to benefits to 
remaining FHA-insured borrowers through lower premium rates. The annual aggregate benefits 
would be approximately $96 million when FHA endorses 1.5 million loans annually and the size 
of the group affected is 21,300.
Aggregate Impact
When FHA endorses 1.5 million loans and this Notice excludes 21,300 loans, the total transfer to 
FHA would be $96 million and the (net) cost of excluding the borrowers would be $85 million. 
To generate an estimate of the net public benefit of the policy change would also entail attaching a 
value to the qualitative argument concerning the public benefit of FHA in providing liquidity. The 
aggregate impacts of the program in the base case are summarized in exhibit 4 below.
Exhibit 4
Costs and Benefits of Notice
Per-Loan Transfer––Avoided FHA Loss
(1) Expected claim $10,268
(2) Premium income $5,777
(3) Expected FHA gain $4,491 (1) – (2)
Per-Loan Cost––Cost of Delaying Transition to Ownership
(4) Expected total cost $9,419
(5) Expected cost of foreclosure $5,446
(6) Expected net costs $3,974 (4) – (5)
Total Costs and Benefits
(7) Loans endorsed in year 1 1.5 million
(8) Loans affected by the Notice 21,300 0.0142 x (8)
(9) FHA losses avoided $96 million (3) x (8)
(10) Costs of exclusion $85 million (6) x (8)
FHA = Federal Housing Administration.
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Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis is merited because the parameters of this model are difficult to predict. The 
number of loans endorsed, average amount of the loan, loss rate, claim rate, and capitalization rate 
all are subject to trends in the real estate and credit markets. The number of loans endorsed does 
not affect the per-loan net benefits, but it will affect the aggregate costs and benefits proportionally. 
In exhibit 5, the aggregate costs and transfers are shown for different numbers of loans affected by 
the rule. The number could vary for two reasons: (1) total endorsements vary or (2) the proportion 
of riskier loans varies. For example, when the Notice was first considered, low FICO (credit-scoring 
model) and high LTV borrowers constituted a greater share of FHA borrowers than they do now. 
It is difficult, however, to predict trends in credit scores. We used the scenario of 21,300 loans 
excluded throughout the analysis. It is reasonable to assume that loans of those characteristics 
would be 50 percent lesser or higher in volume.
Exhibit 5
Aggregate Costs and Transfers of the Notice by Loan Endorsements
Loans affected 14,200 21,300 28,400
Transfer to FHA $64 million $96 million $144 million 
Costs-surplus lost $57 million $85 million $127 million
FHA = Federal Housing Administration.
Alternatives Considered
As mentioned previously, this Notice is only one approach to restoring the MMIF capital reserve 
account. To a large extent, many of the alternative policies are currently being pursued. This No-
tice is focused on riskier borrowers. One way in which this particular Notice could vary is by the 
stringency of the underwriting standards. Consider, for example, a Notice that excluded borrowers 
with a FICO score below 620, a floor that is commonly used by private lenders. There are three 
parameter changes from this alternative. The first is the number of loans affected (9.26 versus 1.42 
percent of all loans endorsed); the second is the cumulative claim rate, which would be slightly 
lower; and the third is the loan size, which would be higher—$159,000 as opposed to $153,000. 
The net effect is that the transfer per loan of the alternative drops by approximately $1,000 to 
$3,336. In addition, the average social cost of excluding a borrower rises by approximately $900.
The change in the claim rates will affect whether the net benefit per loan is positive or negative, the 
size of loan will affect the size of the transfer benefit per loan, and the number of loans will affect 
the aggregate impact of the Notice. The lower claim rates lead to a lower transfer to FHA—$3,336 
as opposed to the base case estimate of $4,491 of this Notice. Although the aggregate transfer to 
FHA would be greater ($460 million) because of the higher number of loans, so would be the 
aggregate net expected cost of delaying homeownership ($668 million). Furthermore, the portion 
of loans excluded under this alternative would be disproportionately composed of borrowers 
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